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ABSTRACT
This paper considers some aspects of Theodore 
Roosevelt's terra as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 
April 19, 1897 to I%y 10, 1B98. The first chapter outlines 
the sea power thesis of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and the 
second chapter establishes Roosevelt's early interest in the 
service which culminated in his appointment to the post of 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
The third chapter shows to what extent Roosevelt 
followed the sea power notions of Captain Mahan. While 
Roosevelt followed Mahan's sea jwsr thesis in many respects 
he did not see its chief significance until after the 
Spanish American War. The significance of Mahan's sea power 
thesis rested on the importance of commerce.
The fourth chapter shows how Roosevelt was virtually 
in charge of the Department of the Navy due to the absences 
of Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long. Roosevelt 
prepared the department and the country for war. The fifth 
chapter shows how well Roosevelt's preparations met the test 
of war and how Secretary of the Navy, John Long, attempted 
to obtain some of the credit for the Navy's success in the 
Spanish American War of 1898.
Ill
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PREFACE
During Theodore Roosevelt’s term as the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, April 19, 1897 - I4ay 10, 1898, 
interest in naval and commercial expansion in the United 
States came to a critical point of development. Alfred 
Thayer Mahan was largely responsible for making naval and 
commercial ideas popular. This paper examines the influence 
of Mahan’s ideas on Roosevelt during this period.
It also examines the relationship which existed 
between the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, and his 
Assistant Secretary, Roosevelt himself.
The first chapter outlines the theory of sea power 
as it was presented in Mahan’s book The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History and in his other writings during this period.
The second chapter establishes the fact that Roosevelt had a 
long standing interest in the navy and in important naval 
personages. It concludes with a discussion of the 
circumstances of Roosevelt's appointment as Assistant Sec­
retary . J the Navy.
The third chapter discusses the extent to which 
Roosevelt followed Mahan's ideas in administering the 
Department of the Navy. It traces the significant influence 
of Mahan on Roosevelt and explains the critical point at
iv
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which Roosevelt did not follow Mahan.
The fourth chapter discusses the overriding influence 
which Roosevelt, though only the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, came to have in the Department. The final chapter 
outlines briefly some of John D. Long’s later views which 
throw into relief his relationship with Roosevelt during 
the period considered by this paper.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Theodore Roosevelt held the position of Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy from April 19, 1897 to May 10, 1898. 
During these approximately thirteen months a large part of 
the early legend of Roosevelt was established. The 
developing crisis with Spain, which occurred during this 
period, had almost reached war proportions with the sinking 
of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour on February 15,
1898. In order to deliver a crippling blow at the Spanish, 
should war result, Roosevelt sent a dispatch on February 25, 
1898 to Dewey who was in command of the Asiatic squadron. The 
Assistant Secretary who was in charge of the affairs in the 
Navy Department on the afternoon of February 25, 1898, ordered 
the Asiatic squadron to Hong Kong where Dewey was to keep 
the ships full of coal. If war were declared it was to be the 
duty of the Asiatic commander to prevent the Spanish 
squadron from leaving the Asiatic coast. Dewey was to remain 
on the flagship Olympia and then begin offensive operations 
in the Philippine Islands.^ It was this effort of 
preparedness which made possible the successful campaign 
of the United States fleet against the Spanish in the
^ George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey 
iNew York, 1913), p. 17?:
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Philippines.
It is often assumed that this dispatch by Roosevelt
in late February was an impetuous act by the junior
executive that was completed while the Secretary of the Navy
2
was absent from the office. But it appears to the present 
writer from a careful reading of Roosevelt's correspondence 
and other related sources that this act was really the 
climax of a series of efforts in an attempt to prepare the 
navy and the country for war. It is just one of the many 
instances which show for all intents and purposes that 
Roosevelt was really the Secretary of the Navy.
Furthermore, Roosevelt was influenced by Mahan's sea 
power thesis and its significance for the United States* 
Accordingly, Roosevelt wao intensely i/..u : : ested in the 
strengthening of the navy. There seems to be a tacit 
assumption that Roosevelt's acceptance of Mahan's sea power
^ Dulles comments on the dispatch sent to Dewey. "It 
had been sent by Roosevelt. Impatient for war to break out, 
anxious that Dewey should have authorization for prompt 
action, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy had seized the 
opportunity of his chief's temporary absence from his office 
to carry preparations for war a good step farther. . . ." 
Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston, 1932), 
p. 204. In a later work Dulles refers to the presence of the 
American fleet off the Philippines as being "due to an 
unusual series of events." Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise 
to World Power 1898 - 1954 (New York, 1955), p. 42. Referring 
to the dispatch John D. Long wrote in his diary that "the 
very devil seemed to possess" his assistant the afternoon he 
cabled Dewey. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday 
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long TSoston, 1923), 
p. 1 6 9 . Most general works seem to agree with the assumption.
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thesis was total and unconditional. This seems to be too 
sweeping a statement.
To evaluate Mahan's influence on Roosevelt it is 
necessary, at this point, to outline the basic principles of 
Mahan's sea power thesis. Mahan's philosophy of sea power 
was compounded from two distinct theories. One was the theory 
of naval strategy and defense. The other was the theory of 
national prosperity based on a program of mercantilistic 
imperialism. From these two theories there evolved a number 
of basic concepts, each of which can be considered as a part 
of the total sea power thesis. These basic concepts were:
(1) Force to replace arbitration on the world scene.
(2) An increase in the size oi ere navy.
(3) Preparation for war in time of peace.
(4) Concentration of the fleet.
(5) The adoption of a world outlook which entailed
Cuba, Hawaii, the Philippines and the Panama Canal.
(6) The importance of commerce.
Mahan saw that force was the determining factor 
3
between states. Arbitration was a good thing but force was 
a necessary factor and the navy was going to supply that 
force. ' He desired to preserve a martial spirit which alone 
could cope "with the destructive forces which from outside
 ^Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History (1890) (New York, Ï957) , p. 2$."
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and from within threaten to submerge all that the centuries 
4
have gained." He looked upon the armaments of Europe as an
insurance of peace among the Western Powers.^ In the struggle
between nations sea power would play a dominant role.
If the navy was going to supply the force in the
future struggle between nations, there existed the necessity
6
of building ships. Mahan hoped that the United States would
embark on a program of overseas expansion as this would
7
necessitate increasing the size of the navy greatly. He was
convinced that the United States was destined to become a 
8
world power. In order to accomplish this goal the size of 
the navy had to be increased. It was necessary to have a 
large fleet in order to support the entire concept of this 
sea power thesis.
The necessity of preparing for war in time of peace 
was one of the basic principles of the sea power thesis.
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Possibilities of an Anglo - 
American Reunion", North American Review. CLIX (1894), 558.
 ^Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The Isthmus and Sea Power", 
Atlantic Monthly, LXXII (1893), 472. Also Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, "The'Future in Relation to American Naval Power", 
Harper's Magazine. XCI (1895), 775.
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Preparedness for Naval 
War", Harper's Magazine. XCIV (1897), 584, 586.
7
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 75.
a
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking 
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 8l6.
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This principle involved the preparation of material and the 
ability to use that material on short notice. Only when these 
preparations were completed could it be said that the country 
was prepared for war,9 If the navy was going to accomplish 
its purpose and play a dominant role in the future of the 
United States, it was necessary to prepare it during peace­
time so that it would be an efficient fighting machine 
during war. This new concept of a prepared navy would 
necessitate the complete reorganization of the old system.
This would allow young and efficient officers to take over 
responsible positions. With efficient officers at the helm 
they would be able to use the war materials effectively on 
short notice. The object of Mahan's thinking was the 
efficiency of the entire fleet.
Officers who were well versed in text-book principles 
would be utterly useless unless they had practical 
experience. If the navy were going to be used as an object of 
force as Mahan's views on arbitration indicated, it would be 
absolutely necessary to have trained men on board. It was 
imperative that the men be able to handle the war materials 
effectively on short notice. Training and preparedness went 
hand in hand. The training of men was most important if the
^ Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Preparedness for Naval War", 
Harper's Magazine, XCIV (1897;, 583.
Ibid., XCIV, 586.
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United States were going to follow its destiny and become a 
11
world power. The necessity of preparing material and
having efficient officers and trained men to use that
material on short notice were essentials in the preparation
for war in time of peace.
Mahan believed that the new American fleet had to be 
12
concentrated if the United States were going to control
the approaches to her own borders. The sea power thesis was
very closely related to strategy and "the essence of Mahan’s
strategy lay in this concept of the command of the sea, this
13
doctrine of concentration of power." It would serve very 
little purpose to construct con.eal essels to protect the 
United States. I'Jhat was needed wa: a fleet that was
able to go  ^ road and destroy the enemy before he came to 
the shores of the United States. This fleet had to be 
concentrated in order to be effective, and Mahan believed in 
this basic principle of the concentration of the fleet.
Ibid.
1 O
Concentration for Mahan entailed two basic principles, 
the strategic location of ships at decisive points with 
coaling stations to support that fleet and the necessity of 
not dividing or dispersing the ships. The total destruction 
of the enemy fleet was the primary consideration and this was 
to be done by a superior naval force. Preying upon commercial 
vessels was a good thing, but it was considered as being 
secondary to concentration. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence 
of Seapower Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957;, pp. 7-13.
13 William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power 
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1947), p. 214.
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The adoption of a world outlook which entailed Cuba,
Hawaii, the Philippines and the Panama Canal was a necessary
principle of the sea power thesis. The new age of technology
resulted in coal driven ships. The age of sail had passed
and in order to give the new warships an increased radius,
coaling stations were needed. By 1890, Mahan saw that the
American people were at last awakening to the greater
14
opportunities awaiting them overseas. This expansion abroad, 
would give the United States colonies which would provide
resting places for the ships^^ where they could coal and
. 16 
repair.
The key in the coming struggle as far as Mahan was
concerned was the Panama Canal. It had become "a strategic
17 18
centre of . . . vital importance." Security of the Canal
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking 
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 8l6 ff.
15 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 25.
Ibid.. pp. 27, 72.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "The United States Looking 
Outward", Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 819.
l8 At this early time Mahan expressed himself as being 
in favour of controlling the approaches to the proposed canal. 
Later he came to the realization that if the canal were 
sufficiently protected by land fortifications, this waterway 
would serve as an effective bridge for the fleet of the United
States, thereby eliminating the need"of maintaining a
battleship fleet in each ocean. Alfred Thayer Mahan,
"Why Fortify the Panama Canal?", North American Review.
CXCIII (1911), 331-9. This was the first real public expression
by Mahan of eliminating the two ocean navy.
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ademanded the establishment of naval supremacy over the
19
Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. This in turn demanded
the acquisition and development of naval bases at strategic
20 21 
points ---  especially in Cuba and Hawaii. It was
22
necessary to have bases in the Caribbean if the United
23
States intended to protect the future Canal. Cuba was
considered to be much more important than Jamaica as a naval 
24
base as the operations of the American fleet could be
easily transferred from one side of the Caribbean to the
other in the event that the United States’ fleet was
25
inferior in size to the enemy’s fleet.
Possession of Hawaii would serve the purpose of
26
protecting the Canal as well as the Pacific seaboard.
19
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’A Twentieth Century 
Outlook’’, Harper’s Mhgazine. XCV (1897), 533»
20
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Strategic Features of 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea’’, Harper’s Magazine, 
XCV (1897), 680.
21
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Hawaii and our Future 
Sea Power”, Forum, XV (1893), 1.
22 Alfred Thayer i4ahan, The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. JO.
Ibid., p. 29.
24
A' red Thayer Mahan, ’’Strategic Features of 
the Gulf of . exico and the Caribbean Sea’’, Harper’s Magazine. 
XCV (1897), 690.
Ibid.. XCV, 685.
? A Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’Hawaii and our Future 
Sea Power’’, Forum, XV (1893), 6-8.
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Acquisition of the Philippines was considered necessary by 
27
Mahan. The development of a world outlook that included
Cuba, the Canal, Hawaii and the Philippines was a basic
principle of the sea power thesis: "Whether they will or no,
Americans must now begin to look outward. The growing
production of the country demands it. An increasing volume
28
of public sentiment demands it." The United States could 
not remain an isolated continental power. By necessity she 
would have to adopt a larger concept of sea power.
Commerce was the most important principle of the sea
power thesis. For Mahan there was a very close association
29
between commerce and the navy. His entire policy was one
of naval, commercial expansion and the idea of protecting
commerce was paramount. Mahan wanted Hawaii to support
30
American commercial expansion. This island would also serve
as a coaling station. Just as the navy depended upon the 
merchant marine during wartime, so too did the merchant
27 The idea of acquiring the Philippines was slow to 
be recognized. Roosevelt did not covet the islands until 
Mahan found need for them as he planned the naval strategy of 
the hoped - for war with Spain. Howard K. Beale, Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore,
Ï95W; -p .- ^ --------------------------------------------------------------------------
78
Alfred Thayer IHahan, "The United States Looking 
Outward", Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890), 822.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Seapower 
Upon History (1890) (New York, 1957), p. 75.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Hawaii and our Future Sea 
Power", Forum, XV (1893), 6-8.
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31
marine rely on the navy during peace. Even the Panama 
Canal had a commercial importance for Mahan because it would 
modify the direction of the trade routes. The Canal was 
important to the Caribbean Sea: "Every position in that sea 
will have enhanced commercial and military value, and the 
canal itself will become a strategic centre of the most
32
vital importance." It is important to note that Mahan 
placed the commercial aspect of the Canal before the military. 
One thing was essential for the greatness of a nation and that 
was commercial supremacy. In order to obtain this commercial 
supremacy and maintain it after it was achieved, a large and 
powerful navy was necessary.
Thus we have two factors that nlay a major role in 
Theodore Roosevelt’s period as Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy:
(a) his own aggressive, impetuous personality and
(b) the influence of Mahan’s sea power thesis on 
his thinking.
It is the hope of the writer to show in the following chapters 
that :
(a) Theodore Roosevelt ’’habitually’’ assumed power in 
the Navy Department and that the famous incident 
of February 25, 1898, far from being an isolated
31
William E. Livezey, 00. cit., pp. 48-9.
32
Alfred Thayer Mahan, ’’The United States Looking 
Outward’’, Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890), 819.
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11
incident, was really the climax of a series of 
events falling into the same basic pattern.
(b) He applied to a considerable extent Mahan’s 
thesis but with a significantly different 
ultimate purpose.
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CHAPTER II 
ROOSEVELT’S EARLY INTEREST IN THE NAVY
A. Sea Power Enthusiasts
The appointment of Roosevelt to the position of
Assistant Secretary of the Navy on April 19, 1897 marked the
culmination of a long standing interest in that service.
During the proceeding eight years Roosevelt had maintained
an interest in naval affairs as well as in important naval
personages. His correspondence reveals that he had spoken
with Captain Mahan as early as 139 ' ina even at that early
date they were discussing plans for exerting pressure on
Congress in the interest of naval expansion. Roosevelt’s
early interest in naval affairs is shown by the fact that
he reviewed Mahan’s book The Influence of Seapower Upon
2
History in October of 1890. The future Assistant Secretary 
realized that there was a need for a large navy composed of 
cruisers and powerful battleships that could meet those of 
any other nation if they were commanded to do so: ’’It is not 
economy —  it is niggardly and foolish —  short-sightedness
^ Siting E. Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), I, 222.
Roosevelt to IHahan, May 12, 189C.
2
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History, a Review", Atlantic Monthly, LXVI (1890),
563-7.
12
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3to cramp our naval expenditures." He had been won over to
the sea power principle of preparedness and as a member of
4the group which advocated the "large" policy, he was to 
express those views of preparedness once he was appointed 
Assistant Secretary^ However, a position in the navy depart­
ment was not even a remote possibility in 1890. Roosevelt 
maintained a connection in public life with Secretary of the 
Navy Benjamin F. Tracy from 1891 to I89I.
This public connection with Tracy was maintained at 
the same time that he came out and expressed notions concern-
 ^ Ibid.. LXVI, 567.
4 The terra "large" was characteristically Rooseveltian 
and anything that had to do with an advanced world outlook was 
referred to as being part of that "large" policy. Cuba, the 
Canal and Hawaii were all considered as part of that policy. 
For a more complete understanding of who the supporters of 
this policy were, Julius W. Pratt, "The ’Large Policy’ of 
1898", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIX (1932),219-42.
 ^Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten IHaxim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XXIII, 182-99.
^ Benjamin F. Tracy was Secretary of the Navy from 
1889 to 1893. An advocate of the large navy, his first annual 
report was a forceful document that reflected the ideas of 
Captain Mahan. The United States had to have a fleet capable 
of driving the enemy from the coast "by threatening his own, 
tthe enemy’s coast3, for a war, though defensive in principle, 
may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its 
operations." 51 Congress, 1 Session, House Executive Document 
No. 1, Part III, p. 4 .
7
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed.. Letters from Theodore 
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870 - 1918 (New York,
1924). p. 119. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, June 20, 
1891. Also ibid., p. 125. February 12, 1893, and ibid., p.132. 
December 24, 1893.
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ing sea power. For Roosevelt, the only way to meet any sea 
power was with sea power itself. The United States had to have 
a first class navy if it were to hold its own with the navy of
g
any European nation. Roosevelt saw the importance of Mahan’s 
9
works but Mahan’s ideas were slow to be recognized in the
United States. Roosevelt thought it most important to have
Mahan remain in the United States. Despite the pressure that
was applied, Mahan was given sea duty on the cruiser Chicago
in 1893 and the visit of the Chicago to England that same
year marked the beginning of fame abroad for the sea power
historianï^ Roosevelt was concerned because Mahan was
getting more attention in London that he was getting in his 
11
own country. Roosevelt’s strong feeling for the navy is
shown in a private letter to his sister when he was informed 
of her engagement to a naval officer. He was overjoyec
g
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon The French Revolution, a Review’’, Atlantic Monthly.
LIXI (1893), 559.
9
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History, a Review’’, Atlantic Monthly. LXVI (1890), 
5o3-7« Also Theodore Roosevelt, ’’The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon The French Revolution, a Review’’, Atlantic 
Monthly LXXI (1893), 556-9, passim.
William E. Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Norman, 
Oklahoma, 1947), p. 13.
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 144. 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, June 3, 1894»
1 2 siting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 464. Theodore 
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, July 4, 1895.
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As the controversy over Venezuela took more
importance on the national scene in 1895 - 1896, the future
Assistant Secretary desired that the people of the United
States should wake up to the need of passing measures to
13provide a good fleet. The boundary dispute between British 
Guiana and Venezuela dated back to I84O. At that time the 
British Government commissioned Sir Robert Schomburgk to 
settle the dispute but the proposed settlement was rejected. 
The Orinoco River was very important to the Venezuelans and 
the boundary dispute revolved around the possession of land 
at the mouth of this river. Venezuelan propaganda began to 
spread in the United States in 1894 and the Cleveland admin­
istration came under fire for its lack of an aggressive 
attitude toward Great Britain. There was mounting protest 
against Britain’s course regarding Venezuela. Secretary of 
State Olney sent a defiant note to London stating that the 
British were violating the Monroe Doctrine and demanding to 
know whether the British would submit the dispute to arbitra­
tion. After a lengthy delay. Lord Salisbury, who directed 
the foreign policy of Great Britain in 1895, replied in the 
negative. Olney and Cleveland were chagrined and they drafted 
a message to Congress in which the President urged that the 
United States run the boundary line itself and if necessary
Ibid., I, 512. Theodore Roosevelt to William 
Cowles, February 11, 1896.
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fight to maintain it. It was a genuine crisis and war was
possible. Roosevelt was overjoyed with the strong stand taken
by Cleveland. The virile Roosevelt wrote: "I rather hope that
the fight will come soon. The clamor of the peace faction has
convinced me that this country needs a war."^^
Yet war did not come as the British people were
unwilling to fight. International complications with the
Boers of South Africa and the Kaiser of Germany convinced
the British to accept arbitration of the boundary dispute.
The treaty of February, 1897 provided for the submission of
15
the dispute to an arbitral board. The United States had 
taken a firm stand and the action of Cleveland was an 
indication that the country had finally accepted its position 
in world affairs. The boundary dispute in Venezuela could 
have resulted in war. The need for a navy to back up the 
decisions made in Congress was obvious. Roosevelt wanted 
measures passed that would provide a good fleet and he 
expressed this idea to his friend and confidant Henry Cabot 
Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts and later Chairman of the
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 
1884 - 1918 (New York, 1925), I, 204-5. Roosevelt to Lodge, 
December 27, 1895.
For a more complete discussion of the Venezuelan 
dispute of 1895, refer to Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic 
History of the American People. 6th ed., (New York, 1958). 
pp. 43o-50. Also Dexter Perkins, A Historv of the Monroe 
Doctrine, rev. ed., (Boston, 19557, pp. 172^1
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Senate Naval Affairs Committee: "More important than any
other question is, it seems to me, the matter of providing
,ev( 
17
an adequate coast defense and an adequate Navy."^^ Roose elt
maintained a friendship with speaker of the House Reed.
18
However, when Speaker Reed failed to supply the leadership
needed on the questions of the navy and coastal defense,
19
Roosevelt was greatly disappointed in him even though he 
was a good friend.
The principles of sea power were recognized by 1896.
There was not a single naval debate in Congress after 1890
in which Mahan’s ideas were not voiced by other men. Men
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., op. cit.. I, 215.
Roosevelt to Lodge, March 13, 1896.
17 Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 132. 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, December 24, 1893. Also 
ibid., pp. 138-3 9. February 25, 1894. Ibid.. p. 142, May 20, 
1894 and ibid.. p. I66. December 22, l895.
18 Reed was the unquestioned leader of the House 
Republicans in 1882, and was raised to the chair of the 
speaker on December 2, 1889. He was fond of Roosevelt, but 
he opposed the entire concept of administrative interference 
in Cuba and Hawaii. Reed considered colonial expansion as 
contrary to the American tradition and entirely impractical. 
He resigned as speaker on September 4, 1899 because he was 
disgusted with the McKinley Administration. Reed was known 
to be a great debater. He seldom spoke for more than ten 
minutes at any one time but his brief comments often 
determined the course of the argument and even the fate of 
the impending measure. Reed did not support Roosevelt’s 
"large" policy. William A. Robinson, "Thomas Brackett 
Reed", in Dumas Malone, ed.. Dictionary of American 
Biography (New York, 1935), XV, 456-9.
19 Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., op. cit.. p. 178. 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, March 21, 1896.
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20such as Morgan, Lodge, Hawley and MoAdoo quoted him liberally*
Roosevelt was concerned with his country’s position with
respect to the outside world:
Though I feel very strongly indeed on such 
questions as municipal reform and civil service 
reform, I feel even more strongly on the 
questions of our attitude towards the outside 
world, with all that it implies, from seacoast 
defence and a first class navy, to a properly 
vigorous foreign policy. I think we ought to 
interfere in Cuba; and indeed I believe it 
would be well were we sufficiently farsighted 
steadily to shape our policy with a view to 
the ultimate removal of all European powers 
from the colonies they hold in the western 
hemisphere. 21
22
While maintaining his public connection with the navy, he
23
continued to correspond with Captain Mahan. In the early
part of 1897 there was talk of Roosevelt’s being offered
the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and if it
were offered he would probably take it because he was
24
’’intensely interested in our Navy.”
20
George T. Davis, A Navy Second to None (New York, 
1940), p. 75*
21
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., 0£. cit.. p. 180. 
Theodore Roosevelt to William Cowles, April 5, 1896.
22 Ibid., p. I8l. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, May 10, 1896.
23 Ibid., p. 202. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, Januarv 17, 1897*
24
Ibid., p. 204. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, Januarv 17, 1897*
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Roosevelt’s interest in the service had grown over
a. period of eight years to such a degree that his ultimate
appointment as Assistant Secretary was considered as a
victory for the sea power enthusiasts. His interest in the
navy had been fostered by public connections and personal
relations as well as from the reading of books. He was
not one to stand idly by and when he discovered the works
of Captain Mahan he found in them ideas on international
25
affairs that were almost identical with his own.
B. Circumstances of Roosevelt’s Appointment as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy
When President McKinley chose John Davis Long to be 
the head of the Navy Department it seemed a definite fore­
cast of a passive naval policy. The new Secretary, a former 
governor of Massachusetts, was a man of good qualities, but
25 It would be false to say that Captain Mahan’s 
work was received by all in the same light. His thesis 
concerning sea power was being used widely in England and 
Germany and was going a long way toward shaping the destiny 
of those two countries. Captain W.D. Puleston, Mahan (New 
Haven, 1939), p. 159. Yet it would be unfair to say that 
Mahan’s writings influenced Turpitz, the recognized genius 
of the German fleet. William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of 
Imperialism 1890 - 1902 (New York, 1951J, p. 441* James 
Bryce openly disagreed with Mahan. James Bryce, ’’The Policy 
of Annexation for the United States”, Forum. XXIV (1897), 
385-95» Carl Schurz disagreed with Mahan. Carl Schurz, 
”Manifest Destiny”, Harper’s Magazine. LXXVII (1893), 737-46. 
Fred Jane was also one to disagree with Mahan. Fred T. Jane, 
"Naval Warfare: Present and Future”, Forum. XXIV (1897),
8-17.
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he had a cautious temperment. Naval reconstruction had
begun in the eighteen eighties and if the policy of expansion
of the navy were to continue leadership from within the
Department seemed especially unfavourable because of the
conservative outlook of the new Secretary of the Navy, John
Davis Long. Leadership might have been provided by the Chief
of the Bureau of Navigation, but he, too, was against the
27
expansion of the navy.
A partial victory was obtained by the advocates 
of the "large” policy when Theodore Roosevelt was appointed 
to the post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. The former 
Police Commissioner of New York had been influenced by Henry 
Cabot Lodge to accept the post if it were offered. A great 
many people wanted McKinley to offer the post to Roosevelt 
because of the tremendous work he had done for the Party in 
helping to defeat Bryan in 1896. Roosevelt was rather 
indifferent in the matter and he was not sure whether he 
should take the position. Not only did he lack pronounced 
backers of political influence in his own state, but he also
26
Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American 
Naval Power 1776 - 1918 (Princeton, 1939), p. 224.
27
The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was the 
principal professional adviser to the Secretary of the Navy 
on technical questions and personnel. Rear - Admiral 
A. S. Crowninshield, who held the position of Chief of the . 
Bureau of Navigation at this time, was an ultraconservative 
officer. George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey 
(New York, 1913), p. 167.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
realized that the position of Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy was "not a big place.Discouragement in his position 
as Police Commissioner led him in the early part of 1897 to
express his willingness to accept the job if it were offered
29
to him. While Roosevelt sat back and waited, advocates of 
the notion of sea power were busily at work pressing for 
his appointment. Lodge had gone to see Secretary Long who 
seemed quite impressed with the possibility of having
Roosevelt as his Assistant Secretary and spoke very highly
30
of him. Long was willing to agree to the appointment. The
31
only difficulty appeared to be at the White House.
The way Roosevelt handled himself in the role of
police Commissioner of New York caused the conservative
32
President McKinley some concern. The pressure to appoint 
Roosevelt was increased and as a result he became the new 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Roosevelt was pleased:
28
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed. 0£. cit.. pp. 199-200. 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, December 20, 1896.
29
Ibid.. p. 204. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, February 21, 1897.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 253»
Lodge to Roosevelt, March 8, 1897*
Ibid.
32 Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt A Biographv 
(New York, 1931), p. 165.
33 Lodge had gone to see President - elect McKinley 
at Canton, Ohio in an attempt to secure Roosevelt’s appoint­
ment. Lodge, ed., ££. cit.. I, 24I. Lodge to Roosevelt, 
December 2, 1896.
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I was even more pleased than I was astonished 
at the appointment; for I had come to look 
upon it as very improbable. McKinley rather 
distrusted me, and Platt actively hated me; 
it was Cabot’s untiring energy and devotion 
which put me in; and Long really wanted me. 34
When Long heard of the appointment he noted in his journal
35
that Roosevelt was the best man for the place.
The appointment of Roosevelt was a victory for the 
advocates of sea power for Roosevelt was looked upon as 
being one of their own select group. He had commented 
favourably on the books written by Mahan and expressed his 
views concerning the need for a large navy in his private 
letters. The driving force of Roosevelt was going to 
counteract the slow moving conservative Secretary. Through­
out the next year Roosevelt laboured to convert Secretary 
Long and President McKinley to his view of naval needs and 
policy through his administrative activities and his public
V, 36 Sp66 Cn6S #
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., on. cit., p. 207* 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, April 11, 1897*
33 Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday 
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long iBoston, 
1923), p. 147.
3^ Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston, 1931), 
p. 81. Also Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His 
Time (New York, 1920), I, 82-4. Also Henry Cabot Lodge, 
ed., op. cit.« I, 276-8 , 284. Roosevelt to Lodge, September 
1 5, 1W7, September 21, 1897 and September 29, 1897.
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CHAPTER III 
ROOSEVELT AND THE CONCEPT OF SEA POV/ER
Roosevelt in his career as Assistant Secretary
reflected with reservations Mahan’s thesis. Even in the
absence of Mahan’s ideas, Roosevelt believed that force and
not arbitration was the significant factor in a country’s
development if it were to take an honourable place as a
world power. It was in the address at the Naval War College
2
that Roosevelt expressed his ideas on diplomacy, arbitration 
and preparedness. This speech, later published under the title
Î
Secretary of the Navy Chandler established the Naval 
War College at Newport, Rhode Island, in Navy Department 
General Order Number 325 of October 6, 1884* Commodore 
Stephen Luce was its first president. Captain Mahan was first 
appointed to the college as a lecturer and served later as 
president. His lectures at the college later resulted in his 
work The Influence of Seapower Upon History. The purpose of 
the college is to prepare officers for higher command. In an 
effort to do this, naval history, policy, strategy, tactics, 
coast defense, naval construction, gunnery and international 
law are touched upon. The college is meant for senior officers 
of the rank of lieutenant commander and above. Officers of the 
other services are invited to attend in an effort to achieve 
co-ordination. At the request of the Naval War College, 
Theodore Roosevelt addressed the students in June of 1897. 
Captain John Stapler, "The Naval War College", United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings. LVIII (1932), 1157 - 63.
2
Whenever Mahan made reference to non-violent methods 
of handling international relations, he always used the term 
arbitration. Whenever Roosevelt made reference to this same 
problem, he usually used the term diplomacy which entailed 
more than arbitration, and more than just the use of external 
force. His later activities as President with respect to the 
Panama Canal illustrate this point
23
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3
"Washington’s Forgotten Maxim", reflected Mahan’s sea power
views.
A. The War College Speech 
This major address of 1897 was delivered by the 
Assistant Secretary on June 2 to the Naval War College at 
Newport. Roosevelt spoke on the subject of national 
preparedness. He had spoken on this before, but this is 
the first time that he received national attention as a 
spokesman for this subjectif"
From this time until his death he was a national 
figure. This address showed serious thought and study. It 
was clearly the result of several years of contemplation^
In this War College Address, Roosevelt gave his ideas on 
sea power. The address was notable as the first elaborate 
expression of Roosevelt’s views on preparation. I'Jhen he later 
became President, Roosevelt’s views on national preparedness 
were a reflection of the principal ideas contained in this 
address. The Assistant Secretary stressed the need for being
3
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Î4axim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 182-99. This speech was first 
published in the official navy journal United States Naval 
Institutes Proceedings, XXIII (1897), and later distributed 
throughout the service. Report of the President of the Naval 
War College and Torpedo School, House Document No. 1, Part 
III, p. 136.
^ Lewis Einstein, Roosevelt, His Mind in Action 
(Boston, 1930), p. 66.
 ^Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Time 
(New York, 1920), I, 74. Also Lewis Einstein, op. cit.-,
p. 66.
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prepared:
In this country there is not the slightest 
danger of an over - development of warlike 
spirit, and there has never been any such 
danger. In all our history there has never 
been a time when preparedness for war was 
any menace to peace. On the contrary, again 
and again we have owed peace to the fact that 
we were prepared for war. 6
In this address he appealed to patriotism in an effort to
convince the people of the necessity of preparedness for
war:
The United States has never once in the 
course of its history suffered harm because 
of preparation for war, or because of 
entering into war. But we have suffered 
incalculable harm, again and again, from a 
foolish failure to prepare for war or from 
reluctance to fight when to fight was 
proper. The men who today protest against 
a navy, and protest also against every 
movement to carry out the traditional policy 
of the country in foreign affairs, and to 
uphold the honor of the flag, are themselves 
but following in the course of those who 
protest against the acquisition of the great 
West. 7
His later views on arbitration were consistent with the 
ideas expressed in this speech:
Preparation for war is the surest 
guaranty for peace. Arbitration is an excellent 
thing, but ultimately those who wish to see 
this country at peace with foreign nations 
will be wise if they place reliance upon a 
first-class fleet of first-class battleships 
rather than on any arbitration treaty which
6
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 182.
^ Ibid.. ÏIII, 187.
U m m S ITY  OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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g
the wit of man can devise.
The use of force was necessary: "No nation can hold its
place in the world, . . . unless it stands ready to guard
9
its rights with an armed hand." Diplomacy placed second
to force: "Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no
force behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the
10
master, of the soldier." Appealing to patriotism through­
out the speech, he closed on the verv same note that he had
opened his talk. It was an appeal for a large navy:
We ask for a great navy, partly because we 
think that the possession of such a navy is 
the surest guaranty of peace, and partly 
because we feel that no national life is 
worth having if the nation is not willing, 
when the need shall arise, to stake 
everything on the supreme arbitrament of war, 
and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and 
its tears like water, rather than submit to
the loss of honor and renown. 11
The speech sounded a new note in the conduct of national
affairs. It was a convincing appeal to American sentiment,
but more important than that, it was a reflection of Mahan’s
notions concerning a large navy, preparedness for war and 
12
arbitration.
^ Ibid.. XIII, 183.




For a comparison with Captain Mahan on these points.
see above pp. 3-5*
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B, Force and Arbitration
Roosevelt gave his views on arbitration in his
important address at the Naval War College. The Assistant
Secretary firmly believed in using force instead of
arbitration. He thought that arbitration was an excellent
thing, but in the end if peace were to be maintained with a
foreign power little faith could be placed in an arbitration
treaty. Reliance should be placed upon a "first-class fleet
of first-class battleships rather than on any arbitration 
13
treaty." He wanted the United States to take its place on
the world scene. If the United States were willing to press
its demands and talk in terms of a major power, the navy
was most important to make her position secure:
Still more is it necessary to have a fleet of 
great battle-ships if we intend to live up to the 
Monroe Doctrine, and to insist upon its observance 
in the two Americas and the islands on either side 
of them. If a foreign power, whether in Europe or 
Asia, should determine to assert its position in 
those lands wherein we feel that our influence 
should be supreme, there is but one way in which 
we can effectively interfere. Diplomacy is utterlv 
useless where there is no force behind it: the 
diplomat is the servant, not the master, of the 
soldier. %îtalics mine) 14
There were others in Congress who spoke in the very same
tone. They had come to realize that force was the only thing
1 "Z .
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim",
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 183. 
Ibid., XIII, 195.




In August of 1897 Roosevelt again reiterated his
conviction that the navy should be used instead of
arbitration: "As an American I should advocate —  and as a
matter of fact do advocate —  keeping our Navy at a pitch
that will enable us to interfere promptly if Germany
16
ventures to touch a foot of American soil." Using the
navy to enforce statements concerning international affairs,
for example, the Monroe Doctrine, is very closely associated
with the concept of having the United States come from its
position of isolation to that of a world power. The advocates
of the sea power thesis desired to use physical force to make
17the United States a world and international power. Roosevelt
Senator Charles W. Jones implied that nations 
would not pay attention to decrees unless the country had 
the physical force to back them up. "What do the nations of 
the earth care about your moral power after you leave your 
own shores." Cited by Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to 
World Power 1898 - 1954 (New York, 1955), pp. 27-8. In Naval 
debates in Congress, Morgan, Lodge, Hawley and McAdoo quoted 
I4ahan's ideas liberally. George T. Davis, A Navy Second to 
None (New York, 1940), p. 75»
Elting E. Morison, ed.. Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 195D,”T, 645« Roosevelt 
to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, August 13, 1897*
17 It is interesting to note that despite the backing 
that Henry Cabot Lodge gave to Mahan's ideas on sea power, 
(Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy", Forum.
XIX (1895), 17* and Congressional Record. 53 rd Congress 3rd 
session (1895) P* 3084*) he differed from the sea power 
historian in one significant respect. Lodge thought that the 
United States had to come out of its isolation but he 
opposed any entanglement in world politics. Foster Rhea 
Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898 - 1954 (New
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was no exception in this respect.
When Long returned to his office late in September
of 1897 after an absence of almost two months, Roosevelt
presented him with a resume of the events that had occurred
during the former's absence. The Assistant Secretary urged
that the Administration provide a sufficient navy to enforce
any assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the American
hemisphere. It would be useless to make those assertions if
the Administration did not have the warships to back up its 
18 .
claims. Roosevelt knew that proposing such an aggressive
policy would have very little effect on the conservative
Secretary so he couched his proposition in reference to
peace, a term that Long would understand: "A great navy does
not make for war, but for peace. It is the cheapest kind of 
19
insurance." Roosevelt presented an aggressive program for
^  20
the Philippines to the President in September of 1897, and 
this program shows that the Assistant Secretary was willing to 
use force as opposed to arbitration. Roosevelt’s actions 
after the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor and the
York, 1955), p. 35. Lodge desired to use the navy only to 
guard the western hemisphere.
l8
Elting E. Morison, ed., cit.. I, 695. 
Roosevelt to Long, September 30, 1897.
Ibid.
20 For a discussion of this aggressive program, 
see below p. 41-2.
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famous dispatch of February 25, 1898, illustrate the same 
theme. Force had become the controlling factor in world
affairs.
C. Increasing the Size of the Navy
Roosevelt's correspondence during the months following
his appointment as Assistant Secretary made reference to the
need for a navy. In August he expressed the wish that "our
22
people would wake up to the need for a big navyI" In
September he wrote to Lodge informing him that a conference
was held with Secretary Long concerning "the need for an
23
increase in the Navy." Roosevelt was merely restating his 
idea of the need for a navy which he had expressed in his 
address at the Naval War College: "We ask that the work of 
upbuilding the navy and the putting of the United States 
where it should be put among maritime powers, go forward 
without a break."2^
Roosevelt's efforts indicate that he was an advocate 
of a large navy. On August 3, 1897, he was quite concerned
21 For a comparison with Mahan's views on arbitration, 
see above pp. 3-4»
22
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, 0£. cit.. I, 78. 
Roosevelt to Captain B. H. McCalla, U.S.N., August 7, 1897*
23 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 
1884 - 19Ï8 iNew York, 1925), I, 284. Roosevelt to Lodge, 
September 29, 1897.
OI
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington's Forgotten.Maxim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 195.
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over the armor plate businesi^and feared that if the yards
26stopped building they would never begin again. The issue 
had been complicated because the bulk of the people were 
ignorant of naval matters and yet they were full of self
27
confidence. Roosevelt was making a serious attempt to
25 Armor plate was first introduced in 1889 by the 
British. At this point, naval architecture had advanced so 
the term protected cruiser, no longer used, designated a 
warship with a thick steel deck designed to give some 
protection to the interior of the vessels. Armored warships - 
battleships and armored cruisers (which later evolved into the 
battle cruiser) - carried armor plate on their sides as well 
as on their decks. These ships carried anywhere from 14" to 
18" of armor across the entire upper deck. Technical 
difficulties were encountered, and the ships were redesigned 
to have anywhere from 14" to 18" of armor at midships to 
protect the vital machinery, with the bow and stern covered 
with approximately 8" of armor plate. Armor plate was also 
placed below the waterline of these ships after 1900, and 
this led to more technical problems.
The process of making this armor plate was quite 
complex. It was necessary to keep the armor plates in the 
furnaces anywhere from 20 to 2$ days depending on the 
hardness desired. One side of the plate was kept at a 
relatively high temperature (1600° F) and the other side of 
the plate was kept relatively low. Carbon would be placed on 
the hot side but would not be allowed to seep through the 
entire piece as this would make the plate too brittle. The 
plate was then removed from the furnace and cooled in oil or 
water. This complex process would have to be repeated if the 
plate had to be straightened or moulded. The furnaces to 
produce this armor plate were perfected by Martin Siemens.
A new and faster method was perfected after the turn of the 
century. It was called carburo didrogino. Carlo Goffi,
Tecnica Moderna Degli Acciai (Milano. 1917) pp. 13-6, 30-7, 
50-3, 67^7^, 136-9. Also Arturo Massenz, Lavorazione E 
Tempera Degli Acciai (Milano, 1921), bP* T96-20i,
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit.. I, 268.
Roosevelt to Lodge, August 3, 1897»
2^ Elting E. Morison, ed., o^. cit.. I, 637.
Roosevelt to William Cowles, August 3, Ï897.
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convince the people of the need for a building program for
the navy: "It would be horrible folly to stop building up 
28
our navy now." In an attempt to reach the people, the
Assistant Secretary wrote to Secretary Long and sent him
the proof of a proposed article. The conservative Secretary
commanded that Roosevelt strike out those portions where he
urged the increase in the size of the navy. The letter that
Long returned showed that he was kind in tone toward the
Assistant, but it also showed that despite the pressure of
the Assistant, the Secretary was still against any increase
29
whatever in the navy.
A few weeks later the again attempted to
convince the Secretary that government policy should allow
Ibid.. I, 637. Roosevelt to Dana, August 3, 1897. 
Charles Anderson Dana was born August 8, 1819 and died 
October 17, 1897. A newspaper editor, he acquired the "New 
York Sun" in I867 and assumed the editorship on January 25, 
1868. This leader of public opinion advocated the annexation 
of Cuba. A follower of the large policy, he abused Cleveland 
for his conciliatory foreign policy. Roosevelt tried to get 
to the public through Dana, as the "New York Sun" was recog­
nized as being an influential paper in 1897* Allan Nevins, 
"Charles Anderson Dana", in Dumas Malone and Allen Johnson, 
eds.. Dictionary of American Biographv (New York, 1930), V,
49- 52.
29
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit., I, 273*
Roosevelt to Lodge, August 26, 1897* After the Spanish 
American War, Long maintained this attitude concerning the 
building up of the navy. John Davis Long, "Shall the Navy 
Be Increased", Independent. LVIII (1905), 639-41* However, he 
did come to the realization that it was folly to wait to the 
last minute to prepare for war. John Davis Long, The New 
American Navy (New York, I903), I, 151*
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the building of two or more battleships or cruisers every
30
year. The steady upbuilding of the navy was a necessary
principle of sea power so far as Roosevelt was concerned.
On September 30, 1897, Roosevelt wrote a long and formal
letter to the Secretary urging in all earnestness that the
Navy Department do "all it can to further a steady and rapid
31
upbuilding of our Navy." The exactness of the report and 
the conviction of the Assistant Secretary are obvious:
I believe that Congress should at once 
give us six (6) new battleships, two (2) to 
be built on the Pacific and four (4) on the 
Atlantic; six (6) large cruisers, of the size 
of the Brooklyn, but in armament more nearly 
approaching the Argentine vessel San Martin; 
and seventy - five (75) torpedo boats, twenty- 
five (25) for the Pacific and fifty (50) for the 
Atlantic. I believe that we should set about 
building all these craft now, and that each 
one should be, if possible, the most formidable 
of its kind afloat, 32
The pressure that had been put on the Secretary by 
the Assistant began to tell. Roosevelt wrote to Lodge in 
strict confidence informing him that the principle of the 
extension of the navy had been won. The Secretary had
3^ Elting E. Morison, ed. op. cit.. I, 67I.
Roosevelt to Long, September 10, 1ÏÏ97* Roosevelt reasoned 
with the Secretary that if the government had a steady 
building program, armor for these ships could be obtained at 
a fairly cheap rate, but otherwise not. The best way to go 
about this would be to approach civilian firms. Government 
firms would be more expensive and there would probably be 
more than a few blunders at the beginning.
Ibid.. I, 695. Roosevelt to Long, September 30,
1897.
Ibid.. I, 696.
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agreed to recommend one additional battleship as well as
additional torpedo boats. Roosevelt realized that it was
very little, yet he understood that the recognition of the
principle of extension had been won and that he was not to 
33stop.
The Secretary may have been won over to this prin­
ciple because of Roosevelt’s action. On September 14, 1897, 
while Long was absent from Washington on an extended summer 
vacation, Roosevelt had gone to the President and secured 
an overruling of the conservative Secretary on the principle 
of an increase in the navy at that time. The President was 
satisfied with what Roosevelt hac lone during the seven weeks 
that he was in charge of the Department:
To my great pleasure he also told me that 
he intended we should go on building up the 
Navy, with battleships and torpedo boats, and 
that he did not think that the Secretary would 
recommend anything he (the President) csicT did 
not approve. Altogether I had a very satisfactory 
talk. 34
Roosevelt kept up the pressure to have the navy 
increased. He had told Captain Mahan that he would do every-
35
thing in his power to impress sea power ideas on the Secretary.
33 Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 294*
Roosevelt to Lodge, November 5, 1897.
Ibid.. I, 277. Roosevelt to Lodge, September 15, 1897<
33 Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit., I, 607. Roosevelt 
to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
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The sinking of the Maine on February 15, 1898, afforded the
Assistant with his best opportunity. With forceful language
he sought to convince the Secretary of a need for more
torpedo boats, raising that total to one hundre^^ On the very
37
next day he urged Long to order additional battleships. He
had proven himself to be an advocate of a large navy. His
actions while in the Department were ever directed to having
the navy increased in size. After Secretary Long had been
eased out of the new President’s Cabinet in 1902, he commented
upon the procurement of ships during his tenure as Secretary of
the Navy: ’’The labor of purchasing vessels devolved to a great
extent upon the office of the assistant secretary, and Mr.
Roosevelt and Mr. Allen were successively efficient in pro-
39
curing ships for the service.’’ Roosevelt saw that a large
navy was necessary and he worked toward obtaining that large
40
navy while he was Assistant Secretary.
3^ Ibid.« I. 775-9. Roosevelt to Long, February 18,
1898.
37
Joseph B. Bishop, pp. cit.. I, 85-6.
38
Allen took over the position of Assistant Secretary 
after Roosevelt resigned in May of 1898 to join the array.
3^ John Davis Long. The New American N a w  (New York. 
1903), I, 152.
To compare this with Mahan’s view on a large navy, 
see above p. 4»
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D. Preparation for War in Time of Peace
Roosevelt sought to achieve preparedness in the
Department of the Navy even though he only held the position
of Assistant Secretary. Before he delivered the address at
the Naval War College, he had written to Mahan asking that
his letter be considered as entirely confidential as his
position allowed him only to carry out the policy of the
Secretary and the President. The Assistant Secretary
expressed the desire to build a dozen new battleships to be
41
equally distributed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
Roosevelt realized that it was necessary to have ships, but
he realized that it was just as necessary to be able to
42
handle those ships effectively on a moments notice.
Throughout the critical period of 1897 to 1898 
Roosevelt sought to increase the efficiency of the navy.
The squadron manoeuvres illustrate Roosevelt’s desire for 
preparedness and efficiency of the fleet. On September 23, 
1897, the Assistant Secretary wrote to Senator Chandler 
concerning the estimates for the department stressing the 
need to increase the estimates where they related to warlike
Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit., I, 607. 
Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
On March 17, 1897, Roosevelt wrote to Lodge with 
reference to the completion of the former’s work on The War 
of 1812. Roosevelt stated that it contained a strong plea 
for a powerful navy and the ability to handle that navy 
effectively. Henry Cabot. Lodge, ed., pp. pit.. I, 255, 
Roosevelt to Lodge.
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efficiency and decrease the estimates where they related to 
43
comfort. An old acquaintance commented in Century Magazine
that while Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary he mastered the
problems of the department and made the navy an efficient
44
fighting machine.
One of the problems that was hindering the navy from
becoming an efficient fighting machine was the antagonism of
45
the line officers and the engineers. Secretary Long had
^3 Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 688.
Roosevelt to Senator Chandler, September 23, 1897* "We do 
need smokeless powder, shells and torpedoes. I am doing my 
best to prevent them from asking for too much for barracks, 
for new buildings, and for anything pertaining merely to 
comfort of the Department; but for what relates to its war­
like efficiency I feel we should strain every effort." It 
must be remembered that Roosevelt was justified in concerning 
himself with departmental estimates as Secretary Long was 
absent from his office and Roosevelt was Acting Secretary.
An Old Acquaintance, "The Personality of President 
Roosevelt", Century Magazine. LXIII (1901), 277»
^3 After the days of the Civil War, the sailing ship 
disappeared from the modern navies of the world. Up to the 
Civil War, the functions of the line officer were considered 
as absolutely necessary for the fighting efficiency of the 
ship. The engineer officer’s duty was considered more as 
supporting the functions of the line officer. However, with 
the advent of modern navies, the engineer branch became more 
and more important because of the increased use of machinery 
on board ship. The status of the engineer officer did not 
change, and the line officer was still considered the most 
important. With the increased use of machinery on board ship, 
the line officer of necessity was becoming more and more of 
an engineer. It was recognized that the need no longer 
existed for a separate body of engineers responsible for only 
a part of the machinery. The need existed for a body of 
officers trained in the duties of the modern line officer. In 
the navy, then as now, there was the tendency to "empire 
building" within a particular branch. With the line officer 
becoming more of an engineer because of the increased use of 
machinery, antagonism resulted. The problem was partially 
solved by the "Personnel Bill" which amalgamated the line 
officer and the engineer officer.
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taken an active interest in the matter and in November of
1897 he appointed a board of eleven naval officers who were
to improve the organization of naval personnel. Roosevelt
was assigned the duty of presiding over their session^^ The
"Personnel Bill" which ultimately became law in 1899 sought
to provide for the line and engineer officers in an effort
to eliminate the long standing antagonism between the two.
The board of eleven naval officers favoured the amalgamation
of the two branches. The bill that was finally proposed and
ultimately passed in 1899 provided for vacancies in the navy
list by enforcing retirement. Without these vacancies,
promotion had been extremely slow. The new bill provided for
a special board of naval officers in charge of reviewing
careers that could force an officer's retirement in order to
provide vacancies and speed up the promotion of able officers.
The need to review the scheme of promoting officers and the
need to eliminate the existing antagonism between the line and
engineering officers were recognized. However, every time
proposals had been made by the Secretary of the Navy or the




Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel 
Bill"; Works (New York, 1926) XIV, 281-2. This article was 
first published in the North American Review. CLXVII (1898).
Ira N. Hollis, "A New Organization for the Navy", 
Atlantic Monthly. LXXX (1897), 309-19.
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The Assistant Secretary did not propose the need
for a personnel bill but he adopted the idea and sought to
give leadership to the board that had been appointed by
Secretary Long. The original plan for the reorganization of
naval personnel to eliminate antagonism was proposed by
Congressman Francis H. Wilson and Professor Holli^f The
49
detailed report submitted by Roosevelt is an indication
of his adoption of any method to improve the efficiency
of the navy. Roosevelt sought to have the "Personnel Bill"
adopted as it would make the navy a more efficient fighting 50
machine.
Roosevelt sought to improve the training of men and
officers so that when the time of war came they would be
ready. In his address at the Naval War College, he asked
that the commanders of ships have the most perfect weapons.
Training was to give them skill in the handling of their 
51
ships. During the same month of June, Roosevelt had written 
to Secretary Long informing him that communications with 
Admiral Sicard indicated that squadron evolutions would take
48
Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel 
Bill", Works (New York, 1926), XIV, 281.
^9 Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 726-40. 
Roosevelt to Long, December 9, 1897.
50
For a comparison of Roosevelt’s ideas on efficiency 
with those of Captain Mahan, see above p. 5-6.
Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 193.
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.  32place during August and September of 1897* Roosevelt told
the Secretary that he had written to Sicard with the hope
that all the armor dads would be tried in squadron. It
would serve little purpose if the Captains of the armor
53
dads were undrilled in fleet tactics. Roosevelt placed a
great deal of emphasis on this aspect of training and he
intended to check the squadron manoeuvres himself.
The Assistant Secretary did follow up on the
proposed fleet manoeuvres and later wrote to Long expressing
his intention to be with the fleet for three days: "Monday
is Labor Day: and Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday I shall
54
be down with the squadron." The Assistant Secretary did 
attend the movements of the fleet and he wrote to Lodge 
confirming this fact. He had visited the Atlantic fleet which 
included the battleships Iowa and New York, and the gunboat
55
Puritan among others. Not only was he present for manoeuvres
52 At this time Secretary Long was absent from the 
office and Roosevelt was holding the position of Acting 
Secretary.
53 Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit.. I, 628. Roosevelt 
to Long, June 18, 1897»
Ibid.. I, 699. Roosevelt to Long, September 4, 1897.
55
The Assistant did not initiate the concept of 
exercises and manoeuvres; the Department had reorganized 
the cruising stations in 1894. At the very same time the 
Department arranged to have all vessels on each station 
assemble periodically for exercises and manoeuvres.
Annual Report - Secretary of the Navy, 1894» 53rd Congress 
3rd Session House Executive Document No. 1, Part III, p. 23.
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but he was present for gun practice as well. Roosevelt
understood that it was worthless to spend millions of dollars
in the building of a perfect fighting machine if the officers
who were in command of that machine were not perfect them- 
57
selves. He realized that patient and faithful attention to
detail not only made for an efficient navy, but it made for
well trained personnel as well. For the Assistant Secretary
the notion of preparedness meant getting each individual aspect
of the Navy Department ready, and that included the training of 
58men.
E. The Concentration of the Fleet 
Assistant Secretary Roosevelt dined with President 
McKinley on September 20, 1897, and at that time he presented 
a paper to the Chief Executive showing him exactly where all 
the ships in the navy were. VThen the junior executive handed 
him this paper, the President was impressed. The Assistant 
Secretary proceeded to outline his plan of action if things 
looked menacing about Spain. Roosevelt would have Walker on
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. pit., I, 275. Roosevelt 
to Lodge, September 11, 1897.
57 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Genesis of the Personnel 
Bill", Works (New York, 1926), XIV, 289.
3^ For a comparison with what Captain Mahan had to 
say concerning the preparation for war and the training of 
men, see above pp. 4-6.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. cit.. I, 278. Roosevelt 
to Lodge, September 21, 1897.
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the Cuban coast with the main fleet within forty-eight hours
after war was declared. He proposed that Evans proceed with
the flying squadron to the coast of Spain and harass the
enemy until some of the battleships stationed near Cuba could
60
be dispatched to aid him. He urged the necessity "of taking
an immediate and prompt initiative if we wished to avoid the
61
chance of some serious trouble." Roosevelt had regulated 
the Atlantic coast so that it was approaching a state of 
preparedness for war. The proposed actions against Spain 
were never taken, but Roosevelt had devoted his every effort 
to preparing the department for war.
Roosevelt attempted to organize the Pacific coast so 
that it too would be in a state of readiness: "Our Asiatic 
squadron should blockade, and if possible take, Manilla. But 
if we should hesitate and let the Spaniards take the initia­
tive, they could give us great temporary annoyance.
Roosevelt attempted to prepare the Asiatic squadron as his
63
conception of sea power demanded.





Whether Roosevelt actually contemplated the conquest 
of the Philippines or merely considered using the Philippines 
as an effective way of waging war against Spain through one of 
her weak positions is not clear from his letters of this period.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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Long proposing to alter the position of ships on foreign 
stations with a view to concentrating them. The Atlantic
64 65
station also came under his review at this time. Again he
stressed the need for taking the initiatives "When war 
comes it should come finally on our initiative, and after 
we have had time to p r e p a r e . R o o s e v e l t  believed that 
force would be used in future relations with international 
powers, and the best way to provide that force was to have 
the American fleets concentrated. The concentration of the 
fleet was a basic principle for Roosevelt.
While at his post, the Assistant Secretary provided 
the inspiration for subordinates to reorganize their charges 
and prepare the country during peace-time so that if war 
came, at least the subordinates would be ready to take the 
initiative and be prepared to succeed. The squadrons were 
concentrated and the navy could be mobilized in a most 
effective manner and in an incredibly short time should a 
crisis result with Spain^^ Long was the conservative type
The object of the Atlantic station or the Atlantic 
fleet was to protect the eastern seaboard of the United States.
65
Siting E. Mori son, ed., _qp. cit., I, 759.
Roosevelt to Long, January I4 , 1S9S. An essential of 
preparedness taught the concentration of the fleet. For a 
comparison with Mahan’s views on this subject see above p. 6.
Ibid.. I, 7 6 3.
E. S. Maclay. History of the United States Navv 
1775 - 1901. rev., (New York, 1^0Î7,'TÎ, 575*
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who would not back an aggressive policy in the department. 
Had the Assistant Secretary not acted, in all likelihood the 
state of the fleet units would have been less advantageous.
F. The Adoption of a World Outlook
The adoption of a world outlook which entailed Cuba,
the Canal, Hawaii and the Philippines was a major concern
for Roosevelt. The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands had
long been considered as a strategic necessity by the
Assistant Secretary and those who supported the "large"
policy.Roosevelt had written to Mahan in confidence
concerning the matter:
I suppose I need not tell you that as regards 
Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed 
I do on foreign policy generally. If I had my 
way we would annex those islands tomorrow. If 
that is impossible we would establish a 
protectorate over them. I believe we should 
build the Nicaraguan canal at once, and 
in the meantime that we should build a dozen 
new battleships. 69
Cuba was also a necessity as far as Roosevelt was
concerned. Early in his public career he desired the
70
Administration to interfere in Cuba.
Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 189# 
(Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959), pp. 147-53, 204-5, 218.
Elting E. Morison, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 607. 
Roosevelt to Mahan, May 3, 1897.
70
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters From 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870 - 1918 
(New Yorkj 1924), pTTL78. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, March 30, 1896.
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He described himself as a "quietly rampant ’Cuba Libre’
man."71 Throughout his tenure as Assistant Secretary he
desired the Administration to interfere in that island’s
affairs: "I have been hoping and working ardently to bring
72
about our interference in Cuba." The island was strategi­
cally necessary so far as Roosevelt was concerned.
The famous February 25, 1898 dispatch to Dewey which 
ordered the squadron to be kept full of coal and to remain
at Hong Kong illustrates Roosevelt’s desire to promote action
73
in that area of the world. The Assistant Secretary wanted 
the United States to look outward. Roosevelt’s world out­
look concerned the outlying areas of Cuba, Hawaii and the 
Philippines. These possessions were to be used as coaling
74
stations for the navy giving the ships an increased radius.
G. The Importance of Commerce 
In his public speeches and correspondence as Assist­
ant Secretary, Roosevelt followed the concept of a large navy 
and patriotism but had very little to say concerning commerce
71 Ibid.« p. 201. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, 
January 2, 1897.
72
Elting E. Morison, ed., 0£. cit., I, 763. Roosevelt 
to Sternberg, January 17, 1898.
7^ For a discussion of this dispatch see below pp. 62-4*
74 por Mahan’s views on a world outlook and the 
importance of coaling stations see above pp. 7-9.
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75
which was an essential of the sea power thesis. The fallacy
of calling Roosevelt an advocate of the entire sea power
thesis results from equating sea power with naval power. It
is evident that the Assistant Secretary was concerned with
naval power as his correspondence for the critical period of
1897 - 1898 illustrates. "But sea power was by no means
76
synonymous with naval power." Roosevelt failed to recognize 
the commercial possibilities of Hawaiian annexation. He saw 
the need for overseas coaling stations such as Hawaii but these 
coaling stations were to serve the navy first. The object of 
the navy in his eyes was to protect the homelanZ^and ensure 
the position of the United States on the international scene.
In his address to the Naval War College he did make a token 
reference to the need for the navy to protect commerce. Prior 
to the Battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, Roosevelt apparently 
did not recognize the importance of commerce.
Perhaps one reason why Roosevelt did not forcefully 
support the commercial portion of the sea power thesis while 
he was Assistant Secretary revolved around the attitude of 
the business community during those years. Business interests
75 To understand that commerce was of primary impor­
tance in Mahan’s concept of sea power, see above pp.9-lC.
William E. Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Norman, 
Oklahoma, 1947), p. 41.
77 Theodore Roosevelt, "Washington’s Forgotten Maxim", 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 192.
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78
had been opposed to Administrative interference in Cuba.
American business journals were opposed to war in 1897,
just as they were opposed to colonial expansion in Hawaii
79
and the Philippines. After the Battle of Manila Bay, the 
business interests became definitely imperialistic if the
desire to retain the Philippines can be taken as evidence
80
of an imperialistic attitude.
Perhaps from reading the business opinion during 
1897, Roosevelt concluded that the most important principle 
of the sea power thesis was the building of a great navy 
with all that it entailed including the acquiring of foreign
7^ Julius V7. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 




After the Battle of Manila Bay the American busi­
ness opinion became imperialistic by virtue of the fact that 
businessmen desired to retain the Philippines. Julius W. 
Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish-American War", 
Hispanic American Historical Review, XIV (1934), 195-6. 
American business realized that the threatened markets in 
China could be defended from this new post. Even before the 
conclusion of the peace with Spain the business segment of 
the American people was building high hopes upon the supposed 
opportunities for trade and exploitation in the Philippines. 
Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Gloucester,l
Massachusetts, 1959), p. 278.
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81
possessions to be used as coaling stations. Regardless 
of what influenced Roosevelt, he did not forcefully express 
any notions with regard to the commercial segment of the 
sea power thesis.
After the Spanish American War of 1898, Roosevelt’s
new concern for commerce is seen in his speech before the
Hamilton Club, Chicago, April 1 0, 1899. This speech was
82
later reprinted under the title "The Strenuous Life."
We cannot sit huddled within our ovm borders 
and avow ourselves merely an assemblage of well- 
to-do hucksters who care nothing what happens 
beyond. Such a policy would defeat even its own 
end; for as the nations grow to have even wider 
and wider interests, and are brought into 
closer and closer contact, if we are to hold 
our own in the struggle for naval and commercial 
supremacy CItalics mine3 we must build up our 
power without our own borders. We must build 
the isthmian canal, and we must grasp the points
81 With regard to the question of coaling stations, 
it must be remembered that Cuba was not the only possibility. 
An offer for the Americans to take over Samanâ Bay appeared 
as early as 1869. The project of annexing the Dominican 
Republic to the United States was almost realized when it 
was discovered that annexation was not a spontaneous feeling 
of the Dominican people. The negotiations then broke down. 
Sumner Welles, Naboth’s Vineyard ; The Dominican Republic 
1844 - 1924 (New York, 1928) , Ï,' 359 -’TÔT» With the outbreak 
of the Spanish War, popular opinion was still much opposed to 
the yoluntary cession of Samanà Bay to the Americans but 
the Dictator Heureaux made it known to the Americans through 
the Consul (April 29, 1898) that no opposition from the 
Dominican Republic’s government would result if the American 
government took possession of Samanâ Bay. Ibid.. II, 529.
82 Theodore Roosevelt, "The Strenuous Life", Works 
(New York, 1926), XIII, 319-31. This essay was one of a 
collection of essays included in a work of Roosevelt entitled 
The Strenuous Life, first published in 1900. The Strenuous 
Life was included in the 1926 edition of his Works.
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of vantage which will enable us to have our say 
in deciding the destiny of the oceans of the 
East and West. 83
A further evidence of this new interest in commerce
was his desire to keep the flag flying over the Philippines
because it would create a market for American factories. On
September 30, 1900, the Kansas City Sunday Journal quoted
Roosevelt as saying: "We are for expansion and anything else
that will tend to benefit the American laborer and manu- 
84
facturer." He had come to realize the importance of 
commerce and what it meant to the greatness of a nation, but 
prior to May 1, 1898, he made little mention of this impor­
tant factor of national greatness. Prior to the Battle of 
Manila Bay, Roosevelt was convinced that the prime factor 
was the navy with all that it entailed. The Assistant Sec­
retary had reached the conclusion that a big naval policy 
had to be followed largely because of the emotional appeal 
of patriotism and nationalism. The navy could defend the 
country and enforce the Monroe Doctrine.
Despite the very close connection maintained between
Mahan and Roosevelt through their correspondence, they dif-
â 5
fered on the importance of commerce. One could say that 
Ibid.. pp. 323-4..
Cited by Howard K. Beale. Theodore Roosevelt and 
the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), p. ?6 .
For a comparison of this with the importance that 
Mahan placed upon commerce, see above pp. 9-10.
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because of his actions Roosevelt proved himself to be an 
advocate of the entire sea power thesis, expressing it 
largely in terms of naval power. He gave only token 
attention to commerce. The sea power historian, Captain 
Mahan, on the other hand explained the sea power thesis 
largely in terms of the commercial benefits that could be 
obtained.
Roosevelt was convinced of the need to use force to 
replace arbitration to increase the size of the navy, to 
prepare for war in time of peace, to concentrate the fleet, 
and to adopt a world outlook. These were basic principles 
of the sea power thesis. However, the Assistant Secretary 
had little to say concerning the importance of commerce which 
was the basic principle of the sea power thesis. Roosevelt’s 
concept of sea power was based on naval supremacy and not 
commercial supremacy.
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CHAPTER IV
SEA POWER CONCEPTS IN ACTION DESPITE JOHN D. LONG
During the period from April 1897 to May 1898 
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long retained his conserv­
ative outlook on life. This was in direct contrast to the 
aggressiveness of Roosevelt. Long did not consider the 
Department of the Navy as being important and he was in the 
habit of absenting himself from the office and leaving 
Roosevelt in charge. This is possibly due to a number of 
reasons, one of them being his indifferent health.^ Long 
had been prevented from taking an active part in the 
Presidential campaign of 1896 because of ill health. 
Washington is noted for having very warm and uncomfortable 
weather during the summer and this perhaps accounts for 
Long’s extended absence during the summer of 1897*
The idea of leaving his post may have been the
result of his administrative procedures. In February of
1898 Long wrote in his journal:
I make Cit3 a point not to trouble myself 
overmuch to acquire a thorough knowledge of the 
details pertaining to any branch of the service.
^ Howard C. Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean 
(Chicago, 1927), p. 26.
2
Lawrence Shaw Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday 
as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long (Boston. 1923), 
p. l46.
51
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Such knowledge would undoubtedly be a very 
valuable equipment, but the range is so 
enormous I could make little progress, and 
that at great expense of health and time, in 
mastering it. My plan is to leave all such 
matters to the bureau chiefs, or other officers 
at naval stations or on board ship, limiting 
myself to the general direction of affairs. 3
Long was more concerned over the small matters of the office
such as "personal appeals, and personal claims."^
A. Selling Sea Power Ideas
Roosevelt’s correspondence from April 1897 to May 
1898 indicates that Long was absent from the office on a 
number of occasions. On April 22, 1897, Roosevelt was 
Acting Secretary of the Navy. Japan was showing an increased 
interest in the Hawaiian Islands at that time and Roosevelt 
took the opportunity to go to President McKinley and assure 
him that the cruiser Philadelphia was in the Islands and 
that other ships could steam there at once if Japan actually 
did send her forces.^ The door to the White House^ had been 





 ^Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Rooseyelt A Biography 
(New York, 1931), 171.
6
The term White House was not officially used until 
1902 when President Rooseyelt had the term White House 
stamped on all the stationery coming from the executive 
mansion. (
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Roosevelt made it a point to acquaint himself with 
naval docks, yards and vessels. Early in May of 1897, just 
after taking the position of Assistant Secretary, he 
investigated the damage to a torpedo boat and submitted an 
official report to the Secretary. After informing the 
Secretary that no serious damage had been done the Assistant 
Secretary stated: "The business of a naval officer is one 
which, above all others, needs daring and decision and if he 
must err on either side the nation can best afford to have




caution." The report was hailed by the pr ss as revealing
a new spirit in the Department of the Navy.
This new spirit in the Navy Department continued to
manifest itself when Roosevelt delivered his address at the
IS ]
10
9Naval War College. The speech was received very coolly by
the Secretary; he did not like it.
Roosevelt’s correspondence with Long indicates that 
the Secretary was absent from Washington on vacation between 
June 16 and July 2, 1897*^ Roosevelt dined with President
7
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and 
His Time (New York, 1920), I, 73.
^ Ibid.
9
For a discussion of Roosevelt’s address to the Naval 
War College, see above pp.24-6.
10
Elting E. Morison, ed., Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1951), I, 623. Roosevelt 
to Mahan, June 9, 1897.
Ibid.. I, 628. Roosevelt to Long, June 18, 1897*
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McKinley that same month of June while Long was absent from
Washington and during the course of the evening the President
expressed himself very strongly on the question of going
12
ahead with the upbuilding of the navy. It is not normal 
procedure for an Assistant Secretary to dine with the 
President as this is usually restricted to the more impor­
tant government officials. However, as an Acting Secretary 
it was permissable for Roosevelt to confer with the President 
on matters of policy and this could serve to counterbalance 
a conservative outlook that Long tried to maintain in the 
Department. Roosevelt became Acting Secretary when Long 
left the office.
Despite Roosevelt’s pressure, indications are that
13Secretary Long possessed a lukewarm attitude on the 
question of the increase of the navy. Roosevelt wrote to 
Long: "I know you will excuse my saying that I can’t help 
being sorry you have reached the conclusion that we are not 
to go on at all in building even, say, one battleship and 
five torpedo - b o a t s . R o o s e v e l t  proposed writing an
12
Ibid.. I, 627. Roosevelt to Lodge, June 17, 1897.
Ibid., I, 622. Roosevelt to Mahan, June 9, 1897* 
"In strict confidence I want to tell you that Secretary Long 
is only lukewarm about building up our Navy."
Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, 0£. cit.. I, 82. 
Roosevelt to Long, August 26, 1897.
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article concerning the views of the Presidents’ with respect 
to the navy and he submitted it to Long for approval. Ever 
since the Address to the Naval War College, Long demanded 
that Roosevelt submit articles intended for publication to 
him. The article (apparently never published) contained a 
strong plea for the strengthening of the navy and the Sec­
retary’s comment upon that article shows that he was opposed 
to the principle of the upbuilding of that force. Roosevelt 
brought the article to the President’s attention. Roosevelt 
had written to the President:’’On the first page, where I 
speak of the need of strengthening the Navy, the words ’in 
my own opinion,’ were put in at the suggestion of the Secre­
tary, to whom I of course submitted the article.
In the early part of September Roosevelt met with the 
President and secured an overruling of the Secretary concern­
ing the principle of the increase of the navy. Long was again 
absent from Washington at that time. The President intended 
that the department "should go on building up the Navy, with 
battleships and torpedo boats, and that he did not think the 
Secretary would recommend anything he (the President) Csic] 
did not a p p r o v e . R o o s e v e l t  had used his personal influence
15 Elting E. Morison, ed., cit.. I, 644. Roosevelt 
to President McKinley, August 30, 1ÏÏ97.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 
1884 - 1918 (New York, 192$), I, 277. Roosevelt to Lodge, 
September 1$, 1897.
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to obtain the enforcement of the sea power ideas in direct
contradiction to the conservative policy that was set down
by Secretary Long. It would have been difficult for Long
to disagree with the President after the President had
already given his approval to the theory of the increase
to Roosevelt. At this time the President "expressed great
satisfaction with what I had done, especially during the
last seven weeks that I have been in charge of the Depart- 
17ment." This would indicate that Long was absent from his 
office from the beginning of August and he did not return 
until September 29, 1897. For two straight months Roosevelt 
had complete charge of the Department of the Navy.
Long’s absence was a test of the Assistant’s initi­
ative and Roosevelt needed very little encouragement. It, 18
was obvious that Long was not in line with the jeune ecole 
of the 1890’s and the only way to get those ideas into effect 
was to act at every opportunity. Roosevelt did just that.
That Roosevelt was taking the initiative in the 
organization and administration of the Navy Department was 
implied when someone sent him an article from the Boston
17
Ibid.. I, 276-7 .
The term jeune ecole was used to identify those 
who were adopting the notions of the sea power thesis with 
its resultant world outlook. This school of the jeune ecole 
had adopted the notions of the "large policy". Writers who 
criticized this new school often used the term jeune ecole 
when speaking of it. Fred T. Jane, "Naval Warfare: Present 
and Future", Forum. XXIV (1897), 240.
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Herald» That article, written in the early part of September
while Long was on vacation and Roosevelt was holding the
position of Acting Secretary, stated in effect that Roosevelt
was trying to assume the functions of the Secretary. The
article made Roosevelt uncomfortable and he wrote to the
19Secretary telling him so. He attempted to justify his
actions to that point: "I have appreciated very much the
confidence you have put in me by letting me act during these
two months, and I have had constantly before me the purpose
never either to do or to fail to do anything save in
20
accordance with your desires." These words seem to indicate
that Roosevelt lacked confidence and initiative. However,
the Assistant Secretary realized that he would have to be
extremely cautions so as not to let the Secretary think that
he was interfering with him or presuming on his own position
21
as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
In his continuing effort to take the initiative in 
the Department, Roosevelt went to see the President just two 
days after writing to Secretary Long concerning the Boston 
Herald article. After dining with the President he
Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 682. 
Roosevelt to Long, September 18, 1897.
Ibid.
Ibid., I, 609. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna 
Roosevelt, May 7, 1897•
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gave him a paper showing exactly where all the ships in the 
22
navy were. At the same time the Assistant Secretary pro­
posed an aggressiye program for the Philippines and for 
23
Cuba as well. The Boston Herald article and the visits 
to the President indicate that during the period that 
Roosevelt was in charge he had gone a long way in taking 
over the entire Department. Long was becoming a mere figure­
head in his office.
With this new position of influence, the Assistant 
sought to increase the pressure on the Secretary concerning
2 A
"the need for an increase in the Navy." The pressure was
having its effect but Roosevelt was still disappointed with
the Secretary’s attitude. The Assistant wanted Long to haye
a more forceful attitude on international matters: "The
Secretary has been a dear, as he always is; I only wish I
could poison his mind so as to make him a shade more truc-
25
ulent in international matters." This never came about 
though sea power enthusiasts saw that partial recognition
22
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., cit.« I, 278.
Roosevelt to Lodge, September 21, 1ÏÏ97.
23
For the discussion of this aggressive program that
was proposed by Roosevelt see above pp. 41-2 ■
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., op. cit.. I, 284* Roosevelt
to Lodge, September 29, 1897. Also Elting E. Morison, ed.,
op. cit., I, 671. Roosevelt to Long, September 10, 1897.
Also ibid.. I, 695. Roosevelt to Long, September 30, 1897*
25
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., Letters From Theodore 
Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles 1870-1918 (New York. iv24), 
p. 209. Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, October 28, 1897.
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had been won in early November concerning the increase in 
the navy: "Now in strict confidence, we have won as regards 
the principle of extension of the Navy with the Secretary; 
he will recommend one additional battleship and additional 
torpedo boats. It is too little but it is a recognition of 
the principle that we are not to stop."^^
B.'Sea Power Ideas Actually Operating 
In an effort to bring the Asiatic station to a state 
of preparedness, Roosevelt sought to have George Dewey ap­
pointed to the Asiatic command. The Assistant Secretary had
followed the career of this officer and knew that he possessed
27
the daring and initiative that were essential for a naval
28officer in the age of sea power. Mahan had seen the need 
for efficiency in the navy and had been urging Roosevelt as 
early as May 1, 1897, to see that the best Admiral be
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., o£. cit., I, 294. Roosevelt
to Lodge, November 5, 1897.
27
28
Henry F. Pringle, £ p . cit., p. 178.
After the Spanish American War, Roosevelt gave some 
idea of what other officers thought concerning Dewey. "In the 
summer of 1897 there were in Washington captains and commanders 
who later won honor for themselves and their country in the war 
with Spain, and who were already known for the dash and skill 
with which they handled their ships, the excellence of their 
gun practice, the good discipline of their crews, and the 
eager desire to win honorable renown. All these men were a 
unit in their faith in the then Commodore Dewey, in their 
desire to serve under him, should the chance arise, and in 
their unquestioning belief that he was the man to meet an 
emergency in a way that would do credit to the flag."
Theodore Roosevelt, "Admiral Dewey", Works (New York, 1926), 
XIII, 421.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
appointed in the Pacific for "much more initiative may be
29thrown on him than can be on the Atlantic man." Roosevelt
was impatient of any red tape that would prevent his quest
for preparedness from being achieved. Dewey later commented
on his appointment:
With the enthusiastic candor which characterizes 
him, he CRooseveltH declared that I ought to have 
the Asiatic Squadron. He asked me if I had any 
political influence. I expressed a natural dis­
inclination to use it. He agreed with the cor­
rectness of my view as an officer, but this was a 
situation where it must be used in self-defence. 30
Roosevelt used the political influence of Republican Senator
Proctor of Vermont to have Dewey appointed to the command of
the Asiatic squadron. It had been secured by the Assistant
31Secretary against the wishes of Secretary Long.^ Long wanted 
Commodore Howell, who was first in line to the next opening of 
a command because of his seniority. Long busied himself with 
personal appeals and personal claims while he was Secretary of 
the Navy and he was angered at Proctor’s visit to McKinley 
which ensured Dewey’s appointment. An indication of his dis­
pleasure is witnessed when Dewey received his orders on 
October 21, 1897, and sailed for the Atlantic station with
Cited by William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, 
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1947), p. 125. Mahan to Roosevelt, May 1, 
1897 in the Roosevelt papers.
George Dewey, Autobiographv of George Dewey 
(New York, 1913), p. loo.
Joseph B. Bishop, o£. cit., I, 96.
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.  32
the rank of Commodore in December of 1897* It was custom­
ary for squadron commanders to hold the rank of Admiral.
Dewey was not appointed to the rank of Admiral until after 
the battle of Manila Bay. Roosevelt was Acting Secretary 
of the Navy on the day that Dewey was appointed. A letter
recommending that Howell be appointed was held on Long's
33desk by Roosevelt until Dewey secured the appointment.
Dewey's appointment was a definite effort on the part of
32
There is a controversy over this appointment 
steming from the various accounts of the participants. As 
shown above, Dewey on the advice of Roosevelt used political 
influence to obtain the position. Secretary Long speaks of 
the appointment of Dewey and states that: "Political or 
personal influence had nothing to do with his selection."
John Davis Long, "The New American Navy; The Battle of 
Manila Bay", Outlook, LXXIII (1903), 784. He repeats this 
same view on another occasion? "I decided to give Dewey the 
Asiatic and Howell the European Station, and this arrange­
ment, on my submitting it to President McKinley, who had made 
no suggestion in the matter, and who always left such matters 
to the Secretary, was approved by him. I remember his simply 
saying to me, in his characteristically pleasant way, 'Are 
you satisfied that Dewey is a good man for the place and that 
his head is level?' to which I affirmatively answered.
Political or personal influence had nothing to do with his 
selection, which was entirely my own." John Davis Long, The 
New American Navy (New York, 1903), I, 177. It is wise to 
accept Dewey's interpretation of his appointment as Long is 
often inaccurate. A careful reading of his work reveals this. 
With regard to the appointment of the Assistant Secretary he 
gives the impression that he had an entirely free hand and 
selected Roosevelt from among several candidates. Long states: 
"In May, 1897, . . .  I selected Roosevelt." Ibid., II, 173.
On the other hand in his journal under the date of April 9,
1897 he writes: "Roosevelt calls. Just appointed Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy. Best man for the place." Lawrence Shaw 
Mayo, ed., op. cit., p. 147.
Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Boston and New 
York, 1931), p. 86.
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Roosevelt to further his plans of promoting sea power ideas
in the Department of the Navy.
The sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbour
on February 15, 1898, convinced Roosevelt that some action had
to be taken. On February 19, 1898, he wrote a pleading letter
to Long. In view of the disaster to the Maine, the Secretary
should recommend the authorization of four battleships by
Congress in order to meet the needs of the country. Not only
would it be of great service to the country but it would be
34
of great service to the Administration as well. The Assist­
ant's letter alarmed Secretary Long and he wrote a personal 
note to Roosevelt in his own hand commanding the Assistant 
to revoke an order he had issued in regard to getting naval 
vessels ready for action and informing him that he would be 
absent for the day: "Do not take any such step affecting
the policy of the Administration without consulting the Pres­
ident or me. I am not away from town and my intention was to
have you look after the routine of the office while I get a
35quiet day off." Roosevelt's desire to enforce sea power 
ideas on the Department was taking the form of direct orders.
The clearest manifestation that the Assistant Sec­
retary had adopted sea power notions was the famous dispatch
Elting E. Morison, ed., op. cit.. I, 780.
Roosevelt to Long, February 19, 1898%
35 Cited by Joseph B. Bishop, pp. cit.. I, 86. Long 
to Roosevelt, February 25, 1898.
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that was sent out on the afternoon of February 25, 1898, while
Secretary Long was absent from the office. This dispatch
greatly shocked John D. Long who confided to his diary:
He seemed to be thoroughly loyal, but the very 
devil seemed to possess him yesterday after­
noon.
Having the authority for that time of 
Acting Secretary he immediately began to launch 
peremptory orders: distributing ships; ordering 
ammunition, which there is no means to move, to 
places where there is no means to store it; . .
. sending messages to Congress for immediate 
legislation, authorizing the enlistment of an 
unlimited number of seamen; and ordering guns 
from the Navy Yard at Washington to New York, 
with a view to arming auxiliary cruisers which 
are now in peaceful commercial pursuit. 37
Many authors since John Long have treated the dis­
patch as the impulsive act of a subordinate who took ad­
vantage of a time when his chief was absent from his post.
3 8
In fact, the dispatch was sent after consultation with Lodge 
and after several weeks of serious thought. From the re­
action of Secretary Long, it is plain that the message did 
not reflect the attitude of Roosevelt's superior, yet it did
This dispatch is reprinted in its entirety in 
George Dewey, pp. cit.. p. 179. "The message to the Asiatic 
Squadron bore the signature of that assistant secretary, who 
had seized the opportunity, while acting secretary, to 
hasten preparations for a conflict which was inevitable. As 
Mr. Roosevelt reasoned, precautions would cost little in 
time of peace and would be invaluable in case of war."
37 Lawrence S. Mayo, ed., pp. cit., pp. 169-70.
Roosevelt and Lodge conspired to send the dis­
patch to Dewey to begin "offensive operations in the Philippine 
Islands." They revealed this after the war was over.- Henry 
Cabot Lodge, ed., pp. cit.. I, 349. Roosevelt to Lodge, 
September-26, 1898.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
64
39
not exceed the limits of reasonable military precaution.
From that day until the time of his resignation in May of
1898, there is no indication that Roosevelt was allowed to
be Acting Secretary again.
Several weeks before the actual hostilities broke
out, L. A. Thurston, an Hawaiian treaty commissioner in 
40
Washington, suggested to the Department of the Navy the 
desirability of buying all the coal in the islands in pre­
paration for war. Roosevelt immediately sent off letters 
and dispatches to achieve that purpose. The purchases were 
completed and on April 12, 1898, the Hawaiian executive 
council voted to allow four additional esplanade lots for 
storage p u r p o s e s . N o  detail was overlooked. Roosevelt was 
unsatisfied with the position of the Department because it 
was not doing more, but the organization was well on the way 
to being fully prepared.
With everything in readiness Roosevelt maintained 
his intimate connection with Captain Mahan during the last 
months before the war in 1898. He wanted to be certain that 
the best advice of this naval Captain would be offered if 
it could contribute in any way to the success of the entire
Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. cit., I, 784.
'^3 A good account of Thurston's part in the Hawaiian 
annexation is given in Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 
(Gloucester, Massachusetts, 1959).
Thomas A. Bailey, "The United States and Hawaii 
During the Spanish American War", American Historical Review. 
XXXVI (1931), 555.
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venture. He sent the sea power historian the tentative plan 
of the campaign that the Assistant Secretary and his sub­
ordinate department heads had developed: "Will you send it
42
back to me with any comments you see fit to make." Mahan
offered his suggestions on the plan a few days later, and
Roosevelt promised to show the suggestions to Secretary Long
43
and then get some of the members of the Board to go over it. 
That the Assistant Secretary was anxious to have war started 
there is little doubt. On April 1, 1898, he wrote to his 
sister: "As for matters here, I’d give all I’m worth to be 
just two days in supreme command. I'd be perfectly willing 
to resign, for I'd have things going so that nobody could 
stop them."^^ Long remained at his post and Roosevelt could 
do no more. If a war came, it would be a test of the pre­
paredness of the Department of the Navy. The Assistant Sec­
retary had gone a long way in his attempt to sell sea power 
ideas to the important men of the country. Now he could only 
wait.
Elting E. Morison, ed., pp. pit., I, 796. Roosevelt 
to Mahan, March 16, 1898.
43 Ibid.. I, 797. Roosevelt to Mahan, March 21, 1898.
Anna Roosevelt Cowles, ed., pp. cit., p. 212. 
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt, April 1, 1898.
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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CHAPTER V 
SOME FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Roosevelt did not have to wait long for war as it
was officially declared on April 25, 1898. Manila Bay was 
a test of the completeness of Roosevelt's preparations. The 
Navy had only to take the initiative to obtain the 
advantage. Dewey made the first move to locate the Spanish 
fleet, but if Roosevelt’s preparations had not been complete 
the Asiatic Squadron in all likelihood would not have 
succeeded. Commodore Dewey steamed into Manila Bay on May 1, 
1898, and completely demolished the Spanish fleet after 
several hours of fighting. The United States' fleet was 
barely touched and suffered few casualties in comparison 
with the Spanish. Dewey was successful, but without the 
Assistant Secretary’s preliminary labours the naval victory 
at Manila Bay would likely have been impossible.^
Lodge realized that Roosevelt's efforts in the 
direction of preparedness had produced the desired results: 
"You in the midst of your own triumphs and dangers I know 
will have many thoughts for the glory won by the American
George Dewey, Autobiography of George Dewey 
(New York, 1913), pp. 170-72. Also Harold and Margaret 
Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power 1776 - 1918 
(Princeton, Ï939)» P* 230.
66
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2
Navy, which you did so much to prepare." An anonymous 
contributor to the Harper's Weekly Magazine commented upon 
the record of the administration and implied that the war 
was fought out before it was begun. The preparations that 
had been made in Washington (largely due to the efforts of 
Roosevelt) were so completed during the time of peace that 
when war did come the Secretary knew at what point on the 
map every ship could be most promptly reached by cable.
Naval yards had been organized so that the yards knew how
long it would take to put idle ships into commission. The
3
position of ammunition and stores was known. The Department
was so well organized that any question that the Secretary
4
could ask could be answered in five minutes. The conduct of 
the war and the speed with which it was terminated made this 
a valid observation.^
After the war with Spain had been fought, the former
2
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.. Selections from the 
Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge 
1884 - 1918 (New York, 19251, I, 319. Lodge to Roosevelt, '
July 6, 1398.
3
Stores is a naval terra and it includes provisions 
and all material that is not permantly attached to the ship.
^ Anonymous, "The Record of the Administration", 
Harper's Weekly. XLV (1901), 251.
3 The reference here to the preparation for and the 
speed with which the war was terminated refers to the Depart­
ment of the Navy and not the Army. The army had trouble with 
its logistics and the confusion at Tampa where the array was 
preparing for the expedition to Cuba bares witness to this 
fact. Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (New York, 1958),
pp. 47-55.
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Assistant Secretary realized the major factors which influ­
enced the outcome. In the first place, the navy won because 
it was prepared. Secondly, the navy won because of the
seamanship and gunnery that had been handed down by service
6
tradition and which had been perfected by patient work.
Because of the never ending practice in the handling of
ships and guns at sea in all kinds of weather, the blockade
of Santiago was successful and the Battle of Manila Bay 
7
likewise.
The commodores and captains who took active 
part in the war had commanded fleets in sea 
service, or at least had been in command of 
single ships in these fleets. There was not 
one thing they were to do in war that they 
had not done in peace save actually receive 
the enemy’s fire. 6
The navy won because it was prepared, and Dewey won the Battle
9
of Manila Bay because of the splendid seamanship of the service. 
6
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’Preparedness and Unpreparedness”, 
Works (New York, 1926), XIII, 409. This 
article was first published in The Century (1699).
^ Ibid.. XIII, 416.
^ Ibid.. XIII, 417.
Q
Theodore Roosevelt, ’’Admiral Dewey”, Works (New 
York, 1926), XIII, 424. This article was first published in 
McClure’s Magazine (1699). This article contains a very fine 
defense for the need of training personnel. ”The victory 
would not have been possible had it not been for the un­
wearied training and practice given the navy . . .  by the 
admirals, the captains, and the crews who incessantly and in 
all weathers kept their vessels exercised, singly and in 
squadron, until the men on the bridge, the men in the gun- 
turrets, and the men in the engine - rooms knew how to do 
their work perfectly, alone or together.” Ibid.. p. 427*
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
The Administration had received criticism for its
actions^ but Long realized that despite the criticism, the
war was a success. If one were to read Long’s account of the
war written in 1902, the Secretary would emerge as a sea
power enthusiast; ’’The war with Spain taught afresh the value 
11
of sea power.” The movement of the ships in the Atlantic 
12
and Pacific and the object of crushing the Spanish squadron
13
in the Philippines while controlling the Atlantic are spoken
of as objectives of the Department. Of course, as head of the
Department Long would get a share of the credit when in
reality these timely moves were the result of Roosevelt’s
initiative and inspiration. Even the orders to Dewey that
were sent on February 25, 1696 are spoken of in terms of a
14
Departmental action. Roosevelt’s name is hardly mentioned
Former President Cleveland was quite critical of 
the actions of the administration during this year. He 
regarded the proposed annexation of the Hawaiian Islands as 
a perversion of the national mission. Statement to the 
Associated Press January 24, 1696, in Allan Nevins, ed.. 
Letters of Grover Cleveland 1650 - 1906 (Boston, 1933), pp. 
491-2. Many of Cleveland’s letters during this year have a 
querulous and critical tone. He was against the jingoism 
which swept the country into war with Spain and the wave of 
imperialist feeling which led Americans to support the policy 
of overseas expansion. Ibid.. p. 471. These were principles 
of the sea power thesis.
John Davis Long,’’The New American Navy; Building 
the New Navy”, Outlook. LXXII (1902), 644.
1 2
John Davis Long, ”The New American Navy; Pre­
paring for the War with Spain”, Outlook. LXXIII (1903), 576.
13 John Davis Long, ’’The New American Navy; The 
Battle of Manila Bay”, Outlook. LXXIII (1903), 760.
Ibid.. LXXIII, 766.
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and all directives are spoken of in terms of the Department.
The work Roosevelt attempted to do with respect to the pre­
paration of the navy was certainly not due to the leadership 
of Long as he was against the principles of the sea power 
thesis. Yet Long states:
The difficulty experienced in adding 
warships to the navy when the country was 
on the eve of hostilities shows the danger 
and folly of a policy which trusts to the 
last moment to make preparation. 15
He had come to the support of the sea power thesis, but his
actions while Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary were much
the opposite.
While Roosevelt was Assistant, Secretary all indications
are that Long did not agree with the principle of the sea power
thesis and was opposed to the increase of the navy. He may have
16
admired Roosevelt but the Secretary proved to be an obstacle 
when it came to introducing the notions of the "large policy". 
It would be foolish to imply that Roosevelt was completely 
responsible for the introduction of sea power ideas into the 
Department of the Navy but it must be stated that his corre­
spondence and memoranda gave the needed inspiration for these
John Davis Long, The New American Navy (New York, 
1903), I, 151.
Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., 0£. cit.. I, 253* Lodge 
to Roosevelt, March 6, 1697. Lodge had spoken to Long con­
cerning Roosevelt at which time Long stated: "Roosevelt has 
the character, standing ability and reputation to entitle 
him to be a Cabinet Minister. Is not this too small for himi"
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ideas which are lacking in the conservative outlook of Long. 
Throughout this period Long appears as the kindly old man who 
was susceptible to personal influence. Roosevelt was never at 
rest and it was his leadership and inspiration in the absence 
of Secretary Long that was largely responsible for the intro­
duction of the notions of sea power into the Department of 
the Navy. Long might have been able to control his department 
to a greater degree had he remained at his post continually 
and not left Roosevelt in charge.
Looking back on Roosevelt's period as Assistant Sec­
retary of the Navy we can see two main themes running through 
his activities. The first of these themes reflects his appli­
cation of Mahan's ideas in Roosevelt's peculiarly chauvinistic 
way, emphasizing the power aspect to the point of even ignor­
ing the central commercial orientation of Mahan's ideas.
Having used Mahan's means almost to the neglect of 
Mahan's goals he pushed in a Rooseveltian, aggressive fashion 
for the navy that was to make his country's world power felt.
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